Many new and proposed emissions trading systems involve multiple countries and regions. The introduction of interregional trading raises questions about how flexible state-or national-level authorities should be in allowing individual firms to trade with firms or authorities in other states or countries. This paper uses laboratory methods to evaluate the efficiency and pricing performance of linking trading across regions at the firm-to-firm level. In one treatment, individual firms trade directly with firms or authorities in other regions. We compare performance in this treatment to an intergovernmental trading treatment, where emissions trading is restricted to occur only between intermediaries. A baseline treatment of autarky, where firms only trade with other firms in their country or region, provides a benchmark to assess the efficiency benefits of allowing linking. Although efficiency and price discovery are both improved by allowing intermediation in linked permit markets, we find that further gains can be realized through direct firm to firm trading. Buyers in high cost regions and sellers in low cost regions benefit the greatest from linking.
Introduction
Emissions trading programs have been successfully used in the last 20 years to regulate environmental problems at the local, national and regional level. The acid rain market to reduce SO 2 emissions in the United States (Joskow et al. 1998; Carlson et al. 2000) and the recent European emissions trading market are prominent examples of such programs (Boemare and Quirion, 2002; Kruger, Oates and Pizer, 2007; Convery, 2009) . Many new and proposed emissions trading systems, particularly those that propose to mitigate climate change, involve multiple countries or regional jurisdictions within countries. Some regulators have explicitly expressed a desire to link their emissions trading programs with other markets, for example the EU (European Community, 2008 ) and a regional Governors' association designing a program for the Midwestern US and Canada (Haites and Mehling, 2009 ) are examining ways to link their markets. This trade integration raises questions about how flexible state-or national-level authorities should be in allowing individual sources such as firms to trade with sources or authorities in other regions or countries. In newly emerging carbon markets at the regional level, such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), Western Climate Initiative (WGI) and Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Accord in the US, decisions will need to be made as to whether firms would be allowed to trade with firms in other states or whether trades only occur through intermediaries (Haites and Mehling, 2009). 1 In this paper we evaluate the efficiency tradeoffs of linking emissions markets by allowing individual sources and firms to trade emissions permits with sources and firms in other markets. 1 Another example of intermediation in environmental markets is water trading in California, where water trading across districts occurs through state or irrigation district intermediaries. Farmers can trade directly with other farmers within districts but not across districts. The California Department of Water Resources recommended that any water transfer market would need a combination of governmental requirements and voluntary limitations (CDWR, 1993) . Intermediation in this application is particularly important due to local externalities, such as stream flow impacts, which are not present in applications such as greenhouse gas emissions.
Regulators may authorize such across-border and across-region trading, and if this trading has effective enforcement then the flexibility and increased liquidity provided by this trading may significantly improve efficiency and price discovery. If instead trading is conducted by government representatives this could lead to significant across-border transaction costs and a reduction in efficiency.
2 Linking markets only through national or regional government representatives could also affect competitive price discovery because it has the potential to increase market power (Böhringer and Löschel, 2003) .
Trading through government agents may however also provide some benefits. Intermediaries could help locate spatially dispersed potential trading partners, screen firms according to different criteria and provide centralized transaction price information. Monitoring and enforcement of regulations need not be identical across linked markets (Tuerk et al., 2009) , and trading through government agents could also potentially reduce enforcement costs since legislation relating to enforcement and compliance would be based at the national or state level.
Even though intermediation or government approval of certain projects could raise transaction costs, these benefits are among the reasons that intermediation was mentioned in the Kyoto Protocol and its Clean Development Mechanism (Gagelmann and Hansjürgens, 2002; Lecocq and Ambrosi, 2007) . Governmental involvement may also be needed to hold some reserve of permits, especially if enforcement is imperfect and regulators hold permits to cover emissions by noncompliant firms (Konishi, 2005) .
Our specific goal in this paper is to investigate price discovery, market efficiency and the 2 In emission markets, transactions costs can arise at various stages of trading. Firms in several of the early national and local emission trading programs reported high levels of search, information, bargaining, decision and reporting costs, all of which can be considered part of transactions costs. Researchers have commented on the importance of transactions costs in tradable emission markets and have raised the concern that these costs can reduce the costeffectiveness of emission markets (Hahn, 1989; Stavins, 1995; Gangadharan, 2000; Cason and Gangadharan, 2003) .
welfare impacts of alternative forms of inter-regional linking. Accurate prices of emission permits are important to help firms decide when to adopt new abatement technology or when to incur research and development expenditures for new technologies. Studying the allocative efficiency and welfare consequences of linking permit markets is useful to understand possible sources of political support for integration. Laboratory experiments allow for careful control and can be particularly useful to examine behavior and performance of emissions markets because it is difficult and costly to examine alternative regulatory scenarios in the field (e.g., for a recent survey see Cason, 2010) . While there are several experimental papers that study different features of emission markets (e.g., Klaassen et al., 2005; Bohm and Carlén, 1999) , ours is the first to explore intermediation and linking.
If markets were perfectly competitive and always in equilibrium, inter-firm trading would strictly dominate trading using intermediaries if intermediaries introduce any transaction costs. In practice, however, the impact of intermediaries could depend on how the markets are organized.
Earlier experimental research on intermediation demonstrated that traders or speculators can significantly reduce price fluctuations in cyclical markets. This is observed in both double auction and posted offer markets, though the convergence to the inter-temporal competitive price is slower when trades are conducted using posted offer rules (Hoffman and Plott, 1981; Williams and Smith, 1984) . Plott and Uhl (1981) examined the behavior of agents or middlemen in markets where buyers and sellers were not allowed to interact directly and find that the prices converged to competitive equilibrium predictions and market efficiency levels were high.
Intermediaries were engaged in inter-temporal transactions in all of these studies, for example buying in one market and then selling in another market in a later period.
In contrast, in our experiment the intermediaries trade across markets and act as both buyers and sellers in the same period. The firms are restricted from trading across markets, with intermediaries needed for all inter-market trades. Although intermediaries like these have often a significant impact on economic activity, they have rarely been studied in experiments. The only directly comparable trading environment is one considered by Kimbrough, Smith and Wilson (2008) , who explore how trades between intermediaries (whom they call merchants) compares to trade between individual firms (called villagers). Merchant intermediaries in their experiment perform a similar role as our intermediaries by taking the product from the local market and selling it in an inter-market meeting place. Their focus, however, is on the process through which intermediation emerges naturally, rather than when it might be required due to explicit regulation.
We report results from three treatment conditions. In the first treatment firms are allowed to trade with firms in other regions, whereas in the second treatment intermediaries have the sole authority of conducting across-border trades. In the first treatment, there is no required intermediation. A third treatment of autarky, where firms only trade with other firms in their own region, helps evaluate the efficiency benefits of allowing inter-market trades.
Our results show that emissions trading across regions leads to higher efficiency and faster convergence to equilibrium prices as compared to the autarky treatment. Buyers in high cost regions and sellers in low cost regions benefit the greatest from linking. The treatment with required intermediation however leads to higher transactions costs because additional trades are required to move permits through the intermediaries, and it also realizes fewer efficiency gains compared to the treatment with direct inter-firm trading. Our results could help explain the role played by intermediaries in various economic exchanges in addition to the emission trading context discussed here. Intermediaries such as private brokers and state trading enterprises, for example, have a significant influence in international agricultural markets. The link between farmers and private brokers can be crucial to facilitate interregional grain flows, particularly in regions that are prone to food insecurity and famines. In some regions, state trading enterprises could control the production and distribution of products that have implications for public health (such as tobacco and alcohol). Although these brokers and public marketing enterprises are perceived to be beneficial for such purposes, they are often observed to engage in anticompetitive trading activities which can have important efficiency and distributional effects (Fafchamps and Hill, 2008; Osborne, 2005; FAO, 2002) .
Experimental Methodology

Design
The experiment followed standard procedures of laboratory markets (Davis and Holt, 1993) , allocating 208 distinct subjects (69 percent male) to separate market sessions conducted on different days. Subjects' trading decisions earned them trading profits, which were paid in cash immediately at the conclusion of their session. Trading occurred simultaneously in four markets, all conducted anonymously on a network of computers that were visually isolated in a dedicated experimental economics laboratory. The different markets could be interpreted as different national or regional emissions permit markets. Participants in these markets are similar to firms who would face different costs of reducing pollution. In some treatments they could trade across different markets (perhaps only through intermediaries) and in another they traded only within the same market. As in standard textbook theory of emissions markets, participants' incentives to trade arose from differences in abatement costs and permit allocations. Those with high marginal abatement costs and low initial permit endowment sought to purchase permits to avoid paying the abatement costs, while those with low marginal abatement costs and high endowments would incur those costs and sell permits. In order to simplify the problem for the participants, these derived marginal trading incentives were provided in reduced form simply as marginal values of acquired permits or marginal costs of sold permits. Buyer and seller roles were assigned and buyers redeem any units bought at their specified marginal values, which correspond to avoided abatement costs. Sellers incur a marginal abatement cost corresponding to each permit that they sell.
3 These values and costs for individual traders are reported at the end of the appendix.
Our choice of abatement cost parameters was guided by the fact that certain countries and regions have already invested more in pollution abatement than others. Those that have invested more have exhausted some low cost abatement options and face higher marginal costs. Hence to capture this in our design, we chose two high cost region-markets and two low cost regionmarkets. Table 1 shows the theoretical competitive equilibrium price ranges, transaction quantities and gains from trade for the cost parameters, based on the price-taking assumption commonly made in emissions markets (Montgomery, 1972) . Although participants face different abatement costs schedules in all four markets, for simplicity we chose autarky equilibrium price predictions that were identical in the two high cost markets and in the two low cost markets. The equilibrium quantity of permits traded was smaller, however, in two of the four markets.
The exact parameters we chose for the four markets were not intended to calibrate to any specific industry, region or pollutant, but we did seek to represent some features of the important case of carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, our choice was informed by integrated assessment models (Hope, 2008) We report 12 sessions, each with sixteen or twenty subjects who trade in a computerized double auction market implemented using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . The double auction trading institution is the standard laboratory institution for implementing relatively competitive market outcomes even with a small number of traders, and it approximates trading rules used on some established organized exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange. Under continuous double auction trading rules, buyers (sellers) were free to post bids (asks) at any time during each 2-minute trading period, but they must offer better terms of trade than existing offers (i.e., bids must be higher than existing bids, and asks must be lower than existing asks). The computer screen for every trader in a particular market was continuously updated with these new offers, and each trader was free to accept an offer from the other side of the market at any time.
Acceptances occur when a trader submits a "crossing" offer; for example, a buyer who submits a bid that is equal to or above the current lowest ask immediately buys the unit at that ask price.
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All previous transaction prices within a period were continuously updated on screen for all traders within each market.
Treatments
We consider three treatments and conducted four sessions in each treatment. All treatments used exactly the same permit supply and demand parameters shown at the end of the appendix.
The first treatment, labeled inter-firm, employed 16 subjects: 2 buyers and 2 sellers in each of 4 markets. In this treatment no restrictions on international trading exist, and all 16 subjects in each session traded freely across markets. Traders incur transactions costs of 1 experimental dollar for each trade and this is split equally between the seller and the buyer. These costs are not based on any empirical calibration but are intended to approximate, in simple form, the reporting costs to the regulator after a trade is consummated or costs of obtaining governmental approval for a proposed trade.
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The second treatment, labeled inter-government, required 20 subjects in each session: 8 buyers, 8 sellers and 4 intermediary agents, spread across the 4 markets. Thus each market had 2 buyers, 2 sellers and 1 intermediary to trade with other markets. In the neutral terminology employed in the experiment instructions we did not use the word government, but instead called 6 We developed these new continuous double auction trading programs in z-Tree that execute trades only through "crossed" limit orders, rather than market orders, in order to reduce price volatility that can occur due to rapid offer acceptances in thin experimental markets. 7 Alternative transaction costs that are proportional to the value of the trade may be appropriate if the goal is to represent commissions paid to private brokers.
these individuals "special traders." Regular buyers and sellers could trade within their local market and they could also buy and sell from the intermediary, who had the sole authority to make inter-market trades. The intermediary agents could trade in two markets (their own market and the special market) and they earn money by buying permits in one market at a low price and then selling those permits in the other market at a higher price. 8 The intermediaries could observe continuously-updated transaction prices in all five markets, so that they could spot profitable intermediation opportunities. The regular buyers and sellers only observed the prices relevant for their profit opportunities: the prices in their own market and in the special (intermediation) market. Intermediaries could carry over unsold permits from one period to the next, effectively allowing for some limited permit banking, until the end of the experiment when those permits in inventory become worthless. This carryover simplified the inventory management problem for these traders and reduced their inventory management risk. Transactions costs were higher in this treatment because 3 trades were required to move a permit from one region to another: when the intermediary agent in region A acquires a permit from a firm in A; when this permit is sold to another intermediary agent in region B; and then again when the permit is sold to a firm in B.
These 3 trades to move a permit across regions result in a transaction cost of 3 experimental dollars. In addition to such exogenous transactions costs, we also examine the common measure of transaction costs in dealer markets-the intermediation costs of the bid-ask spread.
Restrictions that trades occur between intermediaries rather than directly between firms located in different regions could impact market performance in a variety of ways. In addition to increasing transactions costs, the inter-government market may also be rather "thin," particularly in early years when few countries participate, and can result in significant market power. At the extreme, if only two countries or regions open up initially to intergovernmental trading, the international market could even begin as a bilateral monopoly.
The last treatment had 16 subjects in each session, with 2 buyers and 2 sellers in each of the 4 markets. Unlike the first treatment, however, across-market trading was completely prohibited.
This baseline treatment is therefore labeled the autarky treatment. Although these individual 4-trader markets were also thin, previous research has shown that this double auction trading institution can generate highly competitive and efficient trading outcomes even with few traders (Smith, 1982, Proposition 5) . This surprising and important finding is replicated in our study, as traders successfully extracted over 97 percent of the available (autarky) surplus in these 4-trader markets, and prices generally converged to competitive levels. We also observed no systematic evidence of market power exerted in these markets, which would have reduced efficiency substantially, perhaps because the individual markets were symmetric in size, with equal numbers of buyers and sellers.
Procedures
Subjects were undergraduate students at Purdue University. Though some had participated in other economics experiments, all were inexperienced in the sense that they had never participated in a previous session that employed a market with double auction trading rules.
Subjects were randomly assigned to buyer and seller roles upon arrival at the laboratory for 8 periods of double auction "training," which allowed them to gain some experience with the trading interface using the more simple, single market inter-firm environment. Subjects earned trading profits (the difference between their transaction prices and cost or value) as usual in the training periods, but for these periods all buyers had identical marginal values, and all sellers had identical marginal costs. Following the training periods, in the inter-government treatment the four traders who earned the highest training period profits (two buyers and two sellers) were given the more demanding intermediary trader roles in the main experiment. 9 Fifteen trading periods of stationary repetition were conducted for the main experiment in each session, using a set of cost and value parameters that remained unchanged across periods but differed from the set used for the training periods. The exact number of periods was not revealed to the subjects until their session's conclusion, in order to avoid end period effects and to preserve similar trading incentives for intermediaries throughout all periods.
Before the training periods began an experimenter read the instructions aloud while subjects followed along on their own copy. These instructions used neutral terminology throughout, as is the common practice in experimental economics. For example, the instructions simply refer to "units" that the subjects trade, not emissions permits. Following the training periods, in the intergovernment and autarky treatments the longer instructions describing these treatments (such as the multiple markets and roles of the "special traders") were distributed, with the changes from the training instructions highlighted. Only the highlighted changes were read aloud by the experimenter. The instructions for the inter-government treatment are shown in the Appendix.
Subjects earned between US$8.25 and $72.25, with a mean of US$31.50. Including the instruction and training time, sessions usually lasted between 90 and 120 minutes.
Results
We begin with an overview of results from some example sessions before proceeding to a formal performance comparison across treatments. Figure 1 . The difference is that four additional traders can trade as intermediaries to move permits from the low-cost markets 2 and 4 to the high-cost markets 1 and 3. As in the autarky session shown in Figure 1 , initial period prices are dispersed across the 180-250 range of the autarky equilibria, and the triangles and squares indicate that prices tend to be low (high) in the low-cost (high-cost) markets. Inter-market trades conducted by the intermediary traders, indicated by circles, become common beginning in period 2, and over time prices are clearly drawn towards the "international" equilibrium range (211-213). Figure 3 presents the time series of prices for an inter-firm session. Although prices are initially too high in this session, they are clearly converging over time to the international equilibrium range. and they tend to rise in the autarky treatment because prices approach the autarky equilibrium rather than the international equilibrium price range, as illustrated above in Figure 1 .
Column 1 of Table 2 shows the convergence period for each session in the two inter-market trading treatments. The convergence period is defined as the first period in which the median transaction price deviates no more than 10 experimental dollars from the competitive equilibrium interval. Once median prices entered this range of the equilibrium they never exited this range in any later period. A Mann-Whitney U-statistic reported in Table 2 , shows that prices converge to the international competitive equilibrium significantly faster in the inter-firm treatment (within 3 periods) as compared to the inter-government treatment (within 8.5 periods).
Column 2 of Table 2 The equilibrium price deviations are smallest in the inter-firm treatment, as illustrated in Figure   4 , but because one inter-government session also had particularly accurate prices the difference between these two treatments is not statistically significant. However, estimates from a panel regression (not shown), using sessions as the random effect, indicate significantly more accurate prices in the inter-firm treatment (p-value=0.023). Both of these treatments with inter-market trading had prices that deviated significantly less from the international equilibrium than prices in the autarky treatment. Column (3) Figure 5 shows that efficiency in the inter-firm treatment quickly approaches this very high level, and is usually greater than 95 percent. Efficiency in the intergovernment treatment starts lower and rises more slowly, but it reaches or exceeds 90 percent in many of the later periods. Efficiency must be lower than 81.6 percent in the autarky treatment because not all of the gains from trade can be realized without interregional trading, since the initial allocation of permits to the regions is not cost-effective. This is clearly evident in Figure 5 .
Column 4 of Table 2 shows that the differences in efficiency for the three treatments are all highly significant. Panel regressions again provide identical conclusions. Figure 6 shows the trading activity in the inter-government treatment for each of the sessions and indicates that the quantity traded by the intermediary agents is usually below the predicted level, particularly in the larger markets shown on the left side of the figure. This reduced transaction quantity is a main reason for the efficiency loss and imperfect price discovery in the inter-government treatment.
The exogenous transaction costs of 1 experimental dollar per trade represent only a small fraction of the total exchange surplus and do not affect the conclusions we draw regarding relative efficiency across treatments. 11 Traders also face transaction costs when transferring permits across markets because of the spread between the prices at which intermediaries buy and sell permits. This spread generates profits to the intermediaries, but results in a transaction cost to the traders. Figure 7 shows that this spread is often in the 20 to 40 experimental dollar range in the early periods, but it declines over time in all sessions as competition intensifies. In the later periods the average spread is less than 20 experimental dollars in all sessions.
Trading emissions permits through intermediaries also leads to the concern that the uniqueness of their position in the market can tempt them to exercise their market power-socalled "profiteering." We examine the correlation between the profits of the intermediary agents (an indicator of their market power) and the price deviations in the local market from the international equilibrium (for periods 8-15) and find that the correlation is weak (0.10),
suggesting that the agents in our experiment did not exercise market power. Plott and Uhl (1981) draw a similar conclusion in their experiment with intermediaries who can transfer units across sequential trading periods. In our experiment subjects observed both local and inter-market prices, so they had some information about the intermediary agents' costs and benefits from trading. 12 This could lead domestic traders to resist trading at prices which were very different from inter-market prices, restraining intermediaries from exercising market power.
Another possible reason why we do not observe market power in our experiment could be the procedure used to train and select the intermediary agents. They were not trained as monopolists or monopsonists who could restrict trading volume and earn more surplus. 13 Instead they earned more by trading all the profitable units in a period, hence giving an edge to subjects who could successfully trade a high volume. We focused on the ability to trade a large volume since it indicates a characteristic of good intermediaries. In addition, the exercise of market power would presumably not be the main motivation for government intermediaries in emission markets.
Instead, as mentioned before, such agents would be responsible to maintain liquidity and inventory for their regional markets.
Political commentators and climate change experts have repeatedly expressed concerns about the winners and losers from international emissions trading. 14 Average trader profits, summarized in Figure 8 , indicate that buyers in low cost regions earn higher average profits in the autarky treatment since they face low prices. Likewise, in this treatment the sellers in the high cost regions earn higher average profits as they can sell at high prices. When interregional trading is allowed, prices rise in the low cost areas, hurting buyers and helping sellers in those regions; and inter-market trading lowers prices in the high cost areas, helping buyers and hurting sellers there. The less perfect price discovery in the inter-government treatment (compared to the 12 We deliberately provided information about the inter-market prices to address issues relating to external validity. In emissions markets in the field it would be difficult to hide this information. 13 Moreover, in equilibrium intermediaries are not monopolists or monopsonists in their local market. For example, in the large, high-cost market, the intermediary sells 8 permits in equilibrium in the local market, but two permit sellers also sell two permits each and so the intermediary serves two-thirds of the market. 14 Flachsland et al. (2009) discuss the adverse distributional impacts of international emissions trading. Ellerman and Joskow, (2008) discuss how some countries and sectors gained more from the European emissions trading program than others. Unequal gains and losses at the sectoral level have been discussed in the media as well (Lorinc, 2009; Gardner, 2008) .
inter-firm treatment), however, tends to mitigate these profit changes to some extent. Figure 8 also illustrates the share of the surplus captured by the intermediary agents. We could interpret those intermediary profits as a "slice of the surplus pie" that would tend to go to all of the firms if they could trade directly with each other. In particular, the sellers in low cost regions and buyers in high cost regions (who benefit most from interregional trading) appear to lose the most surplus to the intermediaries. Hence those types of firms may exert the greatest political pressure to allow international trading without requiring intermediaries.
Conclusion
Emission markets are being implemented and proposed around the world to reduce the costs involved in mitigating climate change. Research has shown that the actual cost savings achieved can depend critically on the choices of market institutions and the details of trading. This study examines the impact of specific design choices that need to be made when linking emissions trading across different markets. In particular we study if price discovery and efficiency are higher in the emission markets when firms trade directly with each other, than when trade occurs through intermediaries.
Our results indicate clearly that prices more accurately reflect a common inter-regional (across-market) marginal abatement cost when linking is allowed. This increases trading efficiency, and especially benefits buyers in high abatement cost regions and sellers in low abatement cost regions. In practice, such linking would clearly result in a lower overall total cost of meeting an emissions reduction goal. If trade must occur through government agents or other types of intermediaries, our results show that prices are nearly as accurate as when individual emitters in different regions can trade directly, although efficiency levels are significantly lower.
The main drawback of intermediaries is that they could significantly raise transaction costs, leading to reduced trading activity and lower efficiency. Lower trading volume by intermediaries is observed especially in larger emissions trading markets, potentially disadvantaging firms in these markets. This suggests that linking markets using intermediaries can lead to inefficiencies in individual regional markets, and these inefficiencies could spill over to other markets and reduce overall trading efficiency because intermediaries trade insufficient volume both in local and linked markets.
The use of government intermediaries also risks problems of thin markets, especially if few countries or regions participate in international exchange and if trade occurs through bilateral or multilateral negotiation and not through a centralized and competitive trading institution, like the one used in this experiment. 15 An examination of welfare in our study shows that the surplus captured by the intermediaries reduces the profits available for the firms. These profits may be further reduced if trading were organized in alternative ways and depended more on the bargaining abilities of the market participants and less on competitive market forces. For example, Menkhaus, Phillips and Bastian (2003) find that alternative trading institutions can affect market outcomes in agricultural production and processing, with deviations from the competitive model being most in institutions with private, bilateral negotiation. This indicates that a rigorous analysis of the impact of intermediation can be useful. Our experiment helps to provide some empirical guidance for the policy making process by providing detailed information about surplus, efficiency and transactions costs which could be unavailable or 15 Determining which countries would participate in an emissions market is a crucial aspect that can impact the success of climate change policies. Significant controversy surrounding international emissions targets relates to whether developing countries can be incentivized to join climate change agreements. Indeed, some international linking across markets already exists, de facto, through the clean development mechanism (Tuerk et al., 2009; Ellerman and Joskow, 2008) . Although including developing countries would in principle increase efficiency, in practice emission targets in developing countries are perceived to reduce growth as the opportunity costs of emission control may be higher in these countries. Hence designing appropriate incentive schemes that increase the cooperation of developing countries is important.
difficult to measure in the field.
Although one needs to be careful when generalizing from the results of a particular study, we believe that our research can provide some insights about the role played by governmental and non-governmental organizations in different economic exchanges. For example, state trading enterprises, prevalent in the agricultural sector, are often granted exclusive or special rights to influence the level or direction of imports and exports. They are usually producer-controlled, state-sanctioned monopolies with exclusive authority for a wide range of market interventions, such as the regulation and purchase of domestic output, setting consumer and producer prices and conducting foreign trade (FAO, 2002) . Critics of these enterprises argue that their activities are trade distorting. Our results suggest that trading via intermediaries (similar to state trading enterprises) could increase transactions costs thus leading to inefficiencies, but they may not distort prices significantly. Mann-Whitney tests employ session-level averages as the (statistically independent) unit of observation. * denotes that the treatments are significantly different at the 5% level. (Note: Subjects first participated in 8 training periods, which had shorter instructions teaching subjects to be buyers or sellers. The instructions shown here were reviewed after these training periods. The italicized portions were read aloud by the experimenter for this review.)
General
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you will earn considerable money that will be paid to you privately in cash. All earnings on your computer screens are in Experimental Dollars. These Experimental Dollars will be converted to real Dollars at the end of the experiment, at a rate of Experimental Dollars = 1 real Dollar.
We are going to conduct a set of markets in which you will be a participant in a sequence of market trading periods. Attached to these instructions you will find a sheet labeled Personal Record Sheet, which will help you keep track of your earnings based on the decisions you might make. You are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private information. Buyers and sellers will trade in their own market but will know the prices in the special market.
There are five markets in today's experiment and trade will occur in all five
Buyers will have a trading screen which will look like the one in Figure 2 .
A-3 Notice that if a unit costs more than the amount for which you sell it then you suffer a loss in earnings on that unit. If you do not sell any units in a period then your earnings are zero for that period. Importantly, you do not incur the cost of a unit unless you sell that unit. Your costs may be different from the costs of other sellers. Remember, keep an eye on the number of units you have sold so that you don't accidentally sell a unit a price lower than its cost, because this would result in a loss. Sellers are very unlikely to sell all their eight units. experimental dollar for each unit traded, which will be deducted from your earnings.
Special traders
Figure 5: Example Results Screen for a Seller
A-9
How to Buy and Sell
Each trading period will be open for trading for 2 minutes. At any time during the period, any buyer is free to make an offer to buy a unit at a price they choose; likewise, any seller is free to make an offer to sell a unit at a price they choose. Also at any time during the period, any buyer is free to buy at the best offer price specified by the sellers, and any seller is free to sell at the best offer price specified by the buyers.
You will enter offer prices and accept prices to execute transactions using your computer. If there are already Buy Offers displayed in the current period, then new buy offers for that market submitted by any buyer must provide better trading terms to the sellers. Sellers prefer higher prices, so any new buy offers must be higher than the current highest buy offer. Your computer will give you an error message if you try to offer a lower price than the best price currently available.
Buyers observe the Sell Offers made by sellers in their market on the upper left part of their computer screen. They accept the best (that is, lowest offer price) by simply submitting a buy offer that is greater than or equal to this best Sell Offer. This results in an immediate trade at that Sell Offer price. This accepted Sell Offer then disappears from the offer list. Figure 3 shows the market trading screen as seen by sellers. Sellers submit offer prices using the "Sell Offer" box in the upper left of the screen, and then clicking on the "Make Offer"
button. This offer price is immediately displayed on the computer screens for all traders in that market, labeled "Sell Offers." Once this offer price has been submitted, it is binding in the sense A-10 that any buyer can accept this price offer. Such an acceptance results in an immediate trade at that price.
If there are already Sell Offers displayed in the current period, then new sell offers for that market submitted by any seller must provide better trading terms to the buyers. Buyers prefer lower prices, so any new sell offers must be lower than the current lowest sell offer. Your computer will give you an error message if you try to offer a higher price than the best price currently available.
Sellers observe the Buy Offers made by buyers in their market on the upper right part of their computer screen. They accept the best (that is, highest offer price) by simply submitting a sell offer that is less than or equal to this best Buy Offer. This results in an immediate trade at that Buy Offer price. This accepted Buy Offer then disappears from the offer list. 
Recording Rules
Your end of period earnings equal the sum of all profits (positive and negative) on the units that you trade. This total will be displayed briefly on a screen at the end of a trading period.
At the end of a trading period you should write down these earnings in column (2) of your Personal Record Sheet. Keep track of your cumulative profits in column (3), by adding the column (2) period profit to the previous period's cumulative profit. At the end of the experiment you will divide your cumulative profit by the conversion rate to determine your total earnings in real Dollars.
Summary
• Seller earnings on a sold item = sale price of item -cost of item A-11
• Buyer earnings on a purchased item = redemption value of item -price paid for item
• Special traders can trade in two markets.
• Special traders earnings on an item = sale price of item -price paid for item
• Special traders can carry over unsold units from one period to the next, until the end of the experiment when those units in inventory expire as worthless.
• Special traders earn a commission of 10 experimental dollars for each trade in their numbered market.
• All market prices are seen by special traders, and the dedicated buyers and sellers see the prices in their own market and in the special market.
• At any time during the 2-minute trading period, buyers submit offers to buy or accept sellers' offers to sell an item. Sellers submit offers to sell or accept buyers' offers to buy an item.
• New offers to buy must be higher than existing offers to buy, and new offers to sell must be lower than existing offers to sell.
• Profits are computed taking into account initial loan and transaction costs.
• Profits should be recorded on Record Sheets at the end of each period. 
